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I.

THE

THE LIABILITY OF THE PRESS
COLLISION BETWEEN NEWSGATHERING AND TORT LAW

A number of investigative reporters in recent years - who posed as
patients to surreptitiously videotape a physician alleged to be committing medical malpractice before them,' who fraudulently obtained employment with a grocery chain to video tape the repackaging and
redating of foul, rancid meat as fresh,2 and who used deceit to gain
entry to a nursing home to photograph the mistreatment of elderly
residents who were tied to their beds3 - have chosen to commit the
torts of trespass on land or invasion of privacy to get their stories.
Other instances of the practice abound.
When sued, the press has justified resorting to tortious conduct as
the only means available to expose the truth when wrongdoing threatening the public is being denied and concealed by its perpetrators.
This article scrutinizes tort liability of the news media in these cases
through a fresh lens, and advocates the recognition of a newsgathering
privilege based in tort law to shield reporters when sued in tort.
For their efforts in investigating stories of this kind, reporters have
been successfully sued for trespass or invasion of privacy by the wrongdoers they have exposed. The press is vulnerable to such tort actions
4
because there is no First Amendment protection to gather the news.
For decades, the courts have refused to expand the reach of the First
Amendment beyond actual publication, to envelop the pre-publication
investigation and preparation of news stories. To the press, it is a significant and illogical distinction that subjects reporters to tort liability
for their activities in working on a story that are eventually published.
So, to a working reporter, the constitutional protection that shields an
investigative report when it eventually airs on an evening newscast or
appears on a newspaper's front page, provides no safe harbor while
preparing it. The fearlessness of the press that the First Amendment
was intended to ensure, and which the framers considered so vital,
seems illusory to investigative journalists today, who have been made to
heel in that great dog obedience school of the civil justice system-tort
law-for newsgathering activities leading up to the publication of investigative reports.
See In re King World Prods., 898 F.2d 56 (6th Cir. 1990).
See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
See Nancy Stancill, Deadly Neglect: Texas and Its Nursing Homes, HOUSTON
CHRON., July 22-26, 1990, at A-1.
4. See Branzburg v. Hays, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
1.
2.
3.
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The focus of this article is limited to the torts that reporters commit on commercial premises. Analyzed is the collision of the interests
of the press in gathering and unearthing news which may conflict with
the interests of the owners or occupiers of business premises who demand the protection of the laws of trespass and invasion of privacy.
In breaking several major stories the last few years, investigative
reporters have committed the tort of trespass by both entering onto
the nonpublic areas of business establishments without permission,
and by misrepresenting their true identities to obtain consent to enter
a business, plant or office and secretly video or audio tape what they
have seen. The Restatement, Second, of Torts, reflecting the general
rule of trespass in most states, subjects to trespass liability anyone who
intentionally enters the private property or land of another without
their permission, even if no harm is caused the landowner. 5 And, with
respect to one who obtains a landowner's consent to enter their premises by fraud or who otherwise misrepresents their identity or purpose,
such consent is vitiated and the visitor regarded as an unprivileged
6
trespasser.
Reporters have invaded the privacy of the owners and occupiers of
commercial premises by using hidden cameras and microphones, long
range high-powered microphones that can record conversations inside
a corporate boardroom or plant break room from the exterior of the
building, and by misrepresenting their identities and purposes to gain
access to premises under false pretenses. The Restatement frames this
aspect of liability for invasion of privacy in terms of the intentional and
highly offensive intrusion by one upon the solitude or seclusion of
7
another.
In comments to that Restatement section, it is emphasized that
such actionable intrusion does not need to be physical as in "breaking
the close"8 but may well include overhearing a discussion the plaintiff
business owner might have on his or her private property, using binoculars to look through windows of the plaintiff's property, or tapping
the plaintiffs telephone lines.9 As specific illustrations of conduct constituting unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion, the drafters included
a private detective taking photographs with a telephoto lens of the
5.
6.
7.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(2) (1965).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1965).

8.

United States v. Schuler, 27 F. Cas. 978, 979 (1853).

9.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1965).
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plaintiff's residence from an adjoining house, the same detective wiretapping the plaintiff's telephone and recording private conversations,
and a reporter taking photographs of a patient in her hospital room
without her consent for a story on the rare disease she suffered.1 0
The Restatement emphasizes that liability for this branch of the
privacy tort attaches only if the defendant has intruded into a private
place-which would certainly include one's private business property
and the nonpublic areas of any commercial establishment-or within
the sphere of privacy surrounding a person's private activities and affairs.' Thus, the Restatement draws a contrast with photographing a
person who is walking on a public sidewalk or who is doing virtually
anything else in a public place which would not involve that person
being in protected seclusion or solitude.
The discussion and analysis in this article does not reach beyond
the liability of the press for torts committed on private commercial
premises to include, for instance, the legal implications of media ridealongs where reporters obtain the consent of law enforcement officers
and accompany them on raids or arrests of persons in their homes to
capture it all on videotape and air it on television, 12 press coverage of
the removal of victims by medical personnel from accident scenes on
public streets or highways and of fire rescue operations on private
property,' 3 or the harassing of public figures by paparazzi in public
places14-all of which newsgathering activities have been debated for

years.
Rather, the discussion will be narrower and more tightly focused
to resolving the legal issues that attend newsgathering by keying to the
10. See id. illus. 2, 3 and 1.
11. See id. cmt. c.
12. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (analyzing a case in which police
officers allowed reporters to accompany them into the home of a suspect and finding it
a violation of the suspect's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment because

the reporters' presence was not in aid of the warrant's execution).
13. See Florida Pub. Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976), cert denied, 431 U.S.
930 (1977) (trespass and invasion of privacy claims were dismissed when the family of a
victim of a fatal house fire was filmed at the scene by reporters who accompanied
firefighters inside the home);
14. See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (injunctive relief
granted to Jacqueline Onassis requiring celebrity photographer Ronald Galella to stay

at least 100 yards away from her home and 50 yards away from her children after Galella
had harassed the family by physically invading their zone of personal privacy in what the
court characterized as threatening conduct that went "beyond the reasonable grounds

of news gathering.").
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locus of most of the recent headline-making investigative expos6sprivate business premises.
The cases have been vivid. In 1992, ABC television reporters
Lynne Dale and Susan Barnett attempted to investigate alleged unsanitary meat handling practices of the Food Lion grocery chain in North
and South Carolina. 15 Using false identities and fictitious employment
histories that concealed their positions with ABC, they applied for jobs
with Food Lion in order to gain access to the non-public areas of the
stores. 1 6 Barnett was hired as a deli clerk in a South Carolina Food
Lion and Dale was given ajob as a meat wrapper in a North Carolina
Food Lion store. 1 7 In the two weeks that the reporters worked at the
grocery stores posing as employees, they used small "lipstick" cameras
and concealed microphones to record some 45 hours of behind-thescenes footage from employee break rooms to meat cutting tables that
spectacularly confirmed the tip they had received about the chain's
8
food handling practices.'
Portions of the surreptitiously obtained video were broadcast nationally on ABC's Prime Time Live.19 On tape, Food Lion employees
were captured repackaging and redating cuts of unsold fish that were
still in the meat case past the expiration date for safe consumption,
taking beef that was beyond its expiration date and grinding it with
fresh beef to be sold entirely as fresh to unsuspecting customers, and
adding barbeque sauce to mask the odor of chicken that was beyond
20
its expiration date so that it could be sold as fresh.
Outraged at the broadcast, Food Lion sued ABC on several
grounds. They prevailed against the network at the trial court level
with an award of $2902 in compensatory damages, $5.5 million in punitive damages and $2 in nominal damages. 2 1 However, they suffered a
remittiter in excess of $5 million on the punitive damages award at
post-trial and in the final analysis on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held on to the jury's award of $2 in nominal damages based on the food chain's claim that the ABC reporters
had trespassed and were liable for it.22
15.

See Food Lion, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510.

16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.

19.

Id. at 511.

20.
21.

Id.
Id.
See id.

22.
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In affirming the jury's finding of trespass, the Court of Appeals
reasoned23that the reporters engaged in wrongful acts adverse to their
"second" employer's interests by secretly videotaping Food Lion activities in non-public areas of the stores. 24 Significant to the appellate
court's analysis was the jury's finding that the reporters had exceeded
the limits on the scope of the consent and authority Food Lion gave
them as employees on company premises, effectively nullifying the
consent such company employees enjoyed to enter into different areas
on Food Lion property.2 5 In the Court's view, that was sufficient to
sustain the jury's finding of trespass under both North and South Caro26
lina law.
Despite the meager damages that were upheld, the decision infuriated journalists because in the final analysis they were again subjected to legal jeopardy and punishment for giving life not only to the
First Amendment but also to unsuspecting customers of Food Lion
who might well have become seriously ill or might even have died as a
result of eating rancid meat or poultry. To journalists, the Food Lion
case is a perfect example of the invaluable role played by investigative
reporters in our society and the whole reason the Constitution provides protection for the press.
To television stations around the country, to newspapers and
other news organizations with resources less than those of the ABC
Television Network, the question for investigative reporters quickly becomes the extent to which they will go in investigating stories of possible wrongdoing using the tools of their trade that work. To consumers
and others who may benefit from such investigative reports, the question is whether investigative reporters will be as fearless in pursuit of
stories if they are wide open to suit in tort.
The tortious newsgathering by the two ABC reporters in Food Lion
well represents the work of investigativejournalists. In fact, it's but the
video version of Upton Sinclair's 1906 potboiler, THE JUNGLE. 27 In
that book, Sinclair misrepresented his intentions and took ajob as a
meat packer in a Chicago slaughter house, later exposing the shocking
conditions inside the plant which included breathtakingly disgusting
filth, unsanitary conditions throughout the plant, meat handlers and
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See id. at 519.
See id. at 510-11.
See id. at 518.
See id.
UPTON

SINCLAIR,

THE JUNGLE (Penguin Books 1985) (1906).
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other employees who reeked of foul smelling odors "at a hundred
yards", 28 processes so unsafe for workers at the plant that some of them
actually fell into cooking room vats and had their flesh eaten off and
later ended up ground with other ingredients into Durham's pure leaf
lard, and other outrages like the widespread contamination of meat
29
products with rat feces.
The riveting book and the investigation Sinclair undertook led to
the Congress' passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, which
was landmark legislation criminalizing the adulteration of foods.3 0 It
also led to the creation of the Federal Food and Drug Administration,
which to this day continues the work of protecting the public from
unsafe food and drugs. It should be noted that the public demanded
federal action in 1906 in response to the undercover work of Sinclair,
which so graphically exposed that public health threat.3 1 Many citizens reading Sinclair's book in their homes could see those vats and
the rats crawling all over the packing plant. Sinclair's investigation was
a quintessential example of the framers' vision of the press as the eyes
and ears of the public. It illustrates a purpose and a mission which
journalists today view as incalculably greater than any packing plant or
grocery-chain owner's trespass or privacy rights.
It is not just food handlers playing hackey sack with somebody's
quarter pounder that has driven reporters to risk committing torts in
breaking stories they have deemed important. Other instances include
fraudulently gaining entry and secretly videotaping ophthalmologists
reportedly recommending unnecessary eye surgery for elderly patients; 3 2 videotaping employees of a psychic hot line alleged to be perpetrating a fraud on the public; 33 gaining entry to a sham California
cancer clinic to expose the fraudulent care, that led directly to the
34
clinic being closed by state authorities.
The press defends the practice of investigative reporting. In situations where illegal or wrongful activity is being concealed from public
28. Id. at 117.
29. Id.
30. Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906, ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1260 (codified at 21
U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1999)).
31.
See, e.g., Peter Carlson, Meatfrom the Ground Up, WASH. PosT, July 3, 2001, at
C4; Ron Schaumburg, Taming the jungle'; How a Novel Influenced the SanitationPracticesof
the Meat Industry in the United States, 133 N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT 18 (2001).
32.
See Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1347 (7th Cir. 1995).
33. See Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
34. See DON HEwrrr, MINUTE By MINUTE 125-26 (1985).
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view, traditional reporting and newsgathering techniques would most
likely be ineffective. For a reporter to interview on camera the manager of the grocer's meat department about the repackaging of rancid
meat, or the administrator of a nursing home about patients being tied
and abused in order to get an admission of guilt would be unrealistic.
At that point, the more invasive (read that "more tortious") newsgathering techniques are indicated to pry into the nonpublic areas of
those facilities in search of the facts and the truth.
Technological advances have dramatically enhanced the means
available to invade privacy and to trespass onto the land of others. Indeed, technology has fueled the commission of newsgathering torts.
Sophisticated surveillance equipment is readily available to virtually anyone today, including powerful lipstick-size video cameras, enhancedpower miniature microphones and audio recorders that can be perfectly concealed on one's clothing, and even "shotgun mikes" that are
so sensitive they can capture sound from half a block away.
Another facet of this phenomenon is that it is great TV, or, great
newspaper. Secretly recorded video or surreptitiously shot photos
make a story exciting and dramatic. Unquestionably, clandestine
means of newsgathering that attract viewers and readers recommends
itself even further to 60 Minutes and Prime Time Live producers, local
station news directors and newspaper editors.
To the news media, the commission of these torts is the means to
an end-their story. And when that story serves the public interest, it
is the position of the news media that those ends fully justify whatever
means are necessary to achieve them. To the press, there is no difference between "breaking the close" to videotape unsanitary food handling or other threats to the public health and breaking a few eggs to
3
make an omelet.

5

Yet, while so many recent examples of aggressive investigative newsgathering, which undeniably have involved the commission of torts,
scream of the public interest, the courts have traditionally not heard it
36
or been moved by it.

35. See United States v. Schuler, 27 F. Cas. 987 (1853).
36. See Branzburgv. Hays, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Dietemnann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d
245 (9th Cir. 1971).
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THE TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL VIEW REJECTING A
NEWSGATHERING PRIVILEGE

In the seminal case of Branzburg v. Hayes, the U.S. Supreme Court
squarely framed the issue as whether the press can claim a First
Amendment privilege in gathering the news which insulates it from
obedience to laws which apply to everyone else. 37 It squarely answered, no. In Branzburg, a member of the media accepted to testify
fully before a grand jury. The reporter in that case claimed that such
testimony, and his identification of sources he relied upon, would interfere with his ability to gather the news. The reporter argued the
First Amendment constitutional protection accorded publication
should also be extended to newsgathering, because newsgathering was
no less then preparation for what would become a published report
and therefore is inseparable from it.
The Supreme Court was unpersuaded. It held that the First
Amendment does not "invalidate every incidental burdening of the
press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes
of general applicability" 38 and that otherwise valid laws may be enforced against the press just as they are against others despite any possible inconvenience or burden that might be imposed. 39 Refusing to
veer from a decades-long line of decisions in which it had held that the
press has no special immunity from laws of general applicability, the
Court drew a bright line that "the publisher of a newspaper has no
special immunity from the application of general laws' 40 and "no spe41
cial privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others."
To owners and occupiers of commercial premises, what Branzburg
means is that the press can be subjected to liability for trespass and
invasion of privacy even if it is attempting to unearth or gather news
when committing those torts. The depth of the resolve of many courts
since Branzburg in refusing to recognize a First Amendment privilege
to gather the news has punctuated several opinions over the years.
The tort liability of the press for invading the privacy of an herbs
and clay healer was the question in Dietemann v. Time, InC. 4 2 Believing
that Dietemann, the plaintiff-healer, was practicing medicine without a
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Branzburg v. Hays, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Id. at 682.
Id. at 682-83.
Id. at 683 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 682-83 (1937)).
Id.
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F. 2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
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license and endangering the health of unsuspecting citizens whom he
treated, two Life Magazine reporters fraudulently gained entry to his
premises by claiming to be ill and in need of his medical care. 43 After
being welcomed into the plaintiff's home, they were taken to his den
where the plaintiff proceeded to examine the breast of one of the reporters. 44 The other reporter took pictures with a hidden camera of
the plaintiff examining the other reporter. 45 The reporters also
secretly tape recorded the plaintiff's comments, including his diagnosis of the illness as the reporter having "eaten some rancid butter
46
eleven years, nine months and seven days prior to that time."
After the Life reporters captured this quackery on film and tape,
Dietemann was arrested at his home for practicing medicine without a
license. Subsequently, Dietemann successfully sued the magazine for
invasion of privacy and was awarded damages by the trial court.4 7 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a significant
decision that perfectly represents the unavailability of any First Amendment privilege or defense to those in the media who commit torts
while attempting to gather news or expose wrongdoing. 48 Sharply rejecting the reporter's contention that the means used were "indispensable tools of investigative reporting," the court "strongly disagree [d]"
that the use of hidden mechanical devises was indispensable to good
journalism. 49 The court reasoned:
Investigative reporting is an ancient art; its successful
practice long antecedes the invention of miniature cameras and electronic devices. The First Amendment has
never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from
torts or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering. The First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the
50
precincts of another's home or office.
The court had little difficulty characterizing the plaintiff's den,
even though it was the locus in which he practiced his herbal and clay
43.

Id. at 245-46.

44.

Id. at 246.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 250.
Id.
Id.
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healing, as a "sphere from which he could reasonably expect to exclude eavesdropping newsmen.15 1 And, the court concluded that the
"clandestine photography" and tape recording without the plaintiff's
awareness or consent in such a location easily constituted invasion of
privacy for which damages were recoverable. 52 This has been the law
for decades.
III.

RECENT CASES IN WHICH TORT LIABILrIY FOR NEWSGATHERING

HAS BEEN DECIDED INCONSISTENTLY AS COURTS HAVE
LABORED TO CLEAVE A DIFFERENT PATH

The stone wall of formidable precedent denying the press any
privilege to commit torts is crumbling in some states. A few courts are
now providing at least some measure of protection to the press in some
newsgathering cases. To understand how that is being accomplished
without offending Branzburg v. Hays, consideration must begin with a
categorization of cases based on the scene of the offense.
Discussed in this section will be tort claims against the press as a
result of newsgathering that occurred on: A) commercial premises not
open to the public (owners' tort claims); B) commercial premises not
open to the public (employees' tort claims); and C) commercial premises open to the public (owners' tort claims).
A.

Commercial Premises Not Open To The Public-Owners' Tort Claims

The jury's substantial punitive damages verdict in Food Lion did
cause seismic tremors in the press. 53 At trial the jury found the two
reporters liable for trespass and awarded Food Lion $2902 in compensatory damages and $5,545,750 in punitive damages for trespass by
fraudulent acquisition of consent, and $2 in nominal damages for trespass by exceeding consent.5 4 But after the $5 million remittitur ordered by the trial court, what was left to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit was every bit as important as money to the pressthe question of trespass exposure in future cases.
The Fourth Circuit held that even if consent to enter private business property is procured by fraud, it is still valid if the visitors do not
51. Id.
52. See id. at 248.
53. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir.
1999).
54. See id. at 511 (trial judge reduced the compensatory award to $1400 and Food
Lion accepted a remittitur to $315,000 on the punitive award).
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invade "any of the specific interests (relating to peaceable possession
of land) the tort of trespass seeks to protect"

55

The court found that

ABC's reporters had not interfered with Food Lion's ownership of its
land, and did not "disrupt the offices or invade anyone's private
space."5 6 Because of that, the court reversed the jury's finding of tres57
pass liability based on invalid consent.
However, the court did affirm the jury's finding that an alternative
basis for trespass liability had been established. 58 That second predicate was the principle that "even an authorized entry can be trespass if
59
a wrongful act is done in excess of and in abuse of authorized entry."
The court reasoned that when the ABC reporters videotaped the private, nonpublic areas of the store and worked against the interests of
Food Lion, they abused their consent to enter.60 The linchpin of the
decision was the conclusion that as soon as the reporters exceeded the
scope of their consent, they became trespassers and subject to tort lia6
bility for it. '

The Fourth Circuit noted that while there are "First Amendment
interests in news gathering,"6 2 generally applicable laws that have no
more than an incidental impact on expression are not subject to scrutiny.6 3 And, in a final blow to the press on the trespass issue, the court
observed that the media could do its job, if it chose to, "without resort(ing) to the commission of run-of-the-mill torts." 64
The ray of light for the press in Food Lion was the latitude conferred to commit trespass on private commercial premises by fraudulently obtaining consent of the landowner if reporters do not disrupt
offices, invade private spaces, and do not exceed or abuse their consent. 65 The limited benefit to the press of such a rule, however, results
from the fact that reporters often must exceed the scope of their consent to investigate premises of a suspected wrongdoer. That nuance in
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 518 (quoting Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Id. (quoting Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1352-53).
See id.

58.

See id.

59.

Id. at 519 (quoting Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 355 (N.C. Ct. App.

1996)).
60.

. See id.

61.
62.
63.
64.

See id. at 518-19.
Id. at 520 (quoting In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 855 (4th Cir. 1992)).
See id.
Id. at 522. The Fourth Circuit's decision left Food Lion with only the $2 nomi-

nal damage award. Id.
65. See id. at 519.
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the court's reasoning, as well, does little to change the fact that the
ABC reporters were ultimately subjected to tort liability and denied the
First Amendment protection from it, which was the gravamen of ABC's
66
entire argument in the case.
Belluomo v. Kake TV & Radio, Inc. is representative of the state appellate decisions which, like Food Lion, have followed the general rule
and rejected recognition of a reporter's First Amendment privilege to
trespass. 67 In Belluomo, the defendant news organization sent reporters
to accompany a health inspector on an inspection of the plaintiffs restaurant. 68 The reporters persuaded one of the plaintiff's partners to
sign a "release form" giving them permission to film the interior of the
restaurant as the inspector did his work. 69 The crew filmed his inspection of the kitchen and preparation area that uncovered several health
code violations.70 The next day, the non-consenting partner contacted
the reporter and attempted to revoke the permission given by the part71
ner who had signed the release.
The station refused, and aired the video of the inspection in a
report on the restaurant's health code violations. 72 The plaintiff sued
for trespass, arguing that the consent was obtained by misrepresentation. 73 The jury found that the news crew did not trespass in its filming
of the inspection because it had been given permission to enter by one
74
of the partners.
On appeal, the Kansas appellate court first held that putative subsequent revocation of consent to trespass did not negate valid earlier
consent. 75 The question before the court was whether the earlier consent was induced by fraud or misrepresentation, which would render it
invalid. 76 Since the jury had already resolved this question in favor of
77
the defendant television station, the court affirmed the verdict.

66.

See id.

67.

Belluomo v. Kake TV & Radio, Inc., 596 P.2d 832 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979).

68.

See id. at 835.

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See

73.

See id. at 840.

74.
75.

Id. at 835.
Id. at 844.

76.

See id. at 836.

77.

See id. at 843.

at 835, 844.
at 837.
at 836.
id. at 836-37.
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But the Branzburg rule was not followed to the letter. Rejecting
the media's argument that they were protected from trespass liability
by the First Amendment, the court relied on the general rule that
"crimes and torts in news gathering are not protected." 78
But changing the plaintiff in these cases changes the lens through
which courts analyze them.
B.

Commercial Premises Not Open To The Public-Employees' Tort Claim

The 1999 California Supreme Court decision in Sanders v. ABC,
Inc., is particularly instructive on the privacy rights of employees while
79
on the commercial premises of their employers.
In producing a report for Prime Time Live, an ABC reporter answered an employment advertisement placed by a telephone psychic
advice company.8 0 She was hired.8 1 Once on the job in the company's
offices, the reporter secretly video and audio taped two conversations
with Mark Sanders, another employee.82 Six seconds of one of the con83
versations was aired on Prime Time Live.
Sanders sued the reporter and ABC for, inter alia, invasion of privacy and intrusion. 84 Although the jury found for Sanders on the intrusion claim, an intermediate appellate court reversed the judgment on
the basis that Sanders had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
conversations in the workplace because they could ordinarily be overheard by other workers. 85
The California Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's
holding, reasoning that even though the conversations could be overheard by others present, the plaintiff employee could still have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 8 6 The court determined that even on
business premises not open or accessible to the public, like the offices
of telephone psychics which were off limits to the public, employees
still "may enjoy a limited, but legitimate expectation that their conversations and other interactions will not be secretly videotaped by undercover television reporters, even though those conversations may not
78.
79.

Id. at 841 (quoting Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249-50).
Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).

80.
81.

See id. at 70.
See id.

82.

See id.

83.
84.
85.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 69.

86.

See id. at 72-77.
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have been completely private from the participants' coworkers." 8 7 Specifically, the court held that a tort action for intrusion "is not defeated
as a matter of law simply because the events or conversations upon
which the defendant allegedly intruded were not completely private
'88
from all other eyes and ears.
The decisionally significant inquiry, in the court's view, was "the
89
exact nature of the conduct and all the surrounding circumstances,"
rather than whether the secret taping occurred on business premises
open or closed to the public. The purpose of such an inquiry into the
nature of the journalists' conduct in the surrounding circumstances
would be to determine whether the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Noteworthy in this decision is the California court's rejection of
the argument that any intrusion by an investigative journalist secretly
videotaping or recording employees on business premises not open to
the public a fortiori violates such employees' rights to privacy. 90 This
court also emphatically rejected the contention that a worker cannot
claim a reasonable expectation of privacy against secret videotaping
simply because that worker's conversations can be overheard by coworkers. 9 1 The confluence of that reasoning undeniably widens the exposure of journalists to tort actions by allowing claims by workers
whose conversations on business premises can be overheard by coworkers but who can nonetheless establish a reasonable expectation of
privacy from prying reporters.
Well represented by Sanders is the extension of tort protection to
employees on business premises not open to the public. In truth, using the traditional Branzburg analysis, the line between liability and
nonliability for torts committed by reporters is drawn between business
premises open to the public and those parts of the business that are
closed to the public.
C.

Commercial Premises Open to the Public-Owners' Tort Claims

Some courts today are demonstrating a measure of hostility to
trespass and privacy claims of business owners in cases where the press
has committed those wrongs on the areas of business premises open to
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 69.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 77.
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the public. Yet, the question is far from settled, and many jurisdictions
have not shown any willingness to lessen the tort exposure of the press
regardless of the situs of the tort.
The 1998 New York appellate decision in Shffman v. Empire Blue
Cross & Blue Shield cut to the nub of it and followed the traditional
view. 92 In that case, a medical doctor sued CBS for trespass after a reporter gained access to his medical office by posing as a patient and
using a false identity and bogus insurance card. 93 CBS asserted the affirmative defense of consent, claiming that the physician had con94
sented to the entry onto his business premises by the reporter.
Mincing few words, the court rejected that contention by adhering to
the rule that consent obtained by fraud is invalid. 95
The same television network asserted a different defense in 1978
to a similar trespass suit in Le Mistral, Inc. v. CBS.96 In that case, CBS
sent a reporter and camera crew into several New York restaurants that
had been cited for health code violations. 97 One of those restaurants
was Le Mistral. Without permission of the restaurant's owners or management, the CBS crew entered the restaurant with lights on and cameras rolling.98 Refusing the demand of management that they leave
immediately, the crew remained for a short period of time and continued to film while patrons hurried to leave the restaurant or hide from
the camera.

99

CBS defended the trespass suit brought by the restaurant on First
Amendment grounds, arguing that it had a constitutional right to
gather the news which could not be chilled by civil trespass actions
filed by targets of their investigations. 10 0 The appellate court quickly
dispensed with that argument, holding that "[c]learly, the First
Amendment is not a shibboleth before which all other lights must succumb. 01 ' This court "recognizes that the exercise of the ight of free
speech and free press demands and even mandates the observance of
92.

Shiffman v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 681 N.Y.S.2d 511 (App. Div.

1998).
93.

See id. at 512.

94.
95.

See id.
Id. at 512.

96.
97.

Le Mistral, Inc. v. CBS, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 1978).
Id. at 816.

98.
99.
100.
101.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 817.
Id.
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the co-equal duty not to abuse such right, but to utilize it with right
10 2
reason and dignity."'
Adhering to the general rule drawn by Branzburg, Dietemann, and
Galella that newsgathering enjoys no First Amendment protection from
civil actions, the New York court upheld the jury's verdict for the restaurant. 10 3 The court was persuaded that there was sufficient trial evidence that CBS's entry of the restaurant was unauthorized and hence
0 4
trespassory.
An Arizona case, Medical LaboratoryManagement Consultants v. ABC,
Inc., produced a different result. 10 5 An Arizona medical laboratory that
tested pap smears was the target of an ABC investigative report in 1994.
It was broadcast on PrimeTime Live, exposing what were characterized
0 6
as "frequent errors in pap smear testing at medical laboratories."1
The defendant journalists gained access to the plaintiffs medical facility and obtained an interview with the plaintiff by misrepresenting
their identities and posing as investors. 10 7 The meeting between the
plaintiff laboratory owner and the defendant journalists took place in
the plaintiffs conference room on the laboratory's premises.' 0 8 Unknown to the plaintiff, one of the journalists videotaped the entire
meeting with a camera concealed in his hairpiece.10 9
In addition to the interview, ABC's investigators sent several pretreated pap smear slides to the plaintiff laboratory for testing, misrepresenting their true origin and claiming instead that the slides were
from a non-existent women's health center."10 When the segment
aired on the network on May 19, 1994, the most sensational news reported was that the medical laboratory "mistakenly failed to identify
cervical cancer on several of the slides.""' While not identifying the
plaintiff laboratory owner by name, his photograph was used during
the broadcast. The medical laboratory and its owner sued ABC on nu102.
103.
104.
105.
1998).
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. (citations omitted).
See id. at 818.
Id.
Medical Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Ariz.
Id. at 1186.
See id. at 1185.
See id.
See id.at 1186.
See id.
Id.
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merous counts, including trespass and invasion of privacy." 2 The U.S.
District Court for the District of Arizona granted ABC's motion for
1 13
summary judgment on both claims.
In rejecting the plaintiff's privacy claim the court first emphasized
that the cause of action for intrusion upon another's seclusion requires a threshold showing that the plaintiff has "an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation, or
data source," 1 4 that "there is a diminished expectation of privacy in
the work place," 1 5 and that when considering workplace invasion of
privacy claims, courts "have generally found for the plaintiffs only if
the challenged intrusions involved information or activities of a highly
intimate nature." 116 The court then found that the ABC reporters obtained information about the laboratory's testing without invading the
plaintiff's personal solitude or personal affairs. 117 The court concluded
that nothing about the information concerning the accurate testing of
pap smears at medical laboratories involved intimate personal facts relating to the owners of the labs. 1 8 And, since the information gained
by the intrusion related solely to the business and work of the laboratory, the plaintiff could "claim no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the location or contents of the conversation.""19
Secondly, the court reasoned that the plaintiff had failed to establish the second element of the claim for intrusion upon seclusion"that the intrusion must be found to be 'highly offensive to a reasonable person."120 In support of its reasoning, the court cited the California Supreme Court's Shulman v. Group WProductions,Inc. decision in

which it was held that, while there is no blanket newsgathering privilege insulating journalists from torts committed, there remains a de12 1
gree of First Amendment protection for the press in newsgathering.
This protection attaches especially when "the public's interest in the
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See id.
See id. at 1209.
Id. at 1188.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1188-89.

118.

Id.

119.

Id. at 1189.
Id. (citing RESrATEMENT

120.
law).
121.

See id. at 1190.
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news and the absence of less invasive methods of reporting the story
1 22
may mitigate the offensiveness of the [tort of] intrusion."
The Arizona District Court embraced the Shulman balancing test,
emphasizing the public interest in newsgathering. 123 The finding that
the hidden camera interview with the plaintiff in this case did not intrude on his home or any aspects of his private life, but rather unearthed "information that was clearly in the public interest because the
results of the [pap smear] tests involved vital health issues" compelled
the determination as a matter of law that the intrusion was not highly
offensive.' 24 On those bases, ABC was granted summary judgment on
125
the privacy claim.
The Arizona court's reasoning in dismissing the plaintiff's trespass
count is also noteworthy. While the plaintiffs consent to the conference room interview with ABC reporters was fraudulently obtained and
invalid, the court found that the plaintiff's trespass claim failed on causation grounds. 126 Specifically, the court held that any damages the
plaintiff suffered by reason of the broadcast "were not proximately
caused by the trespass." 127 Rather, they resulted from mistakes made
by the laboratory in failing to diagnose cervical cancer in several of the
pap smear slides, which the court found was unconnected to the
trespass. 128
The application of the reasoning of this case to the thesis of this
article could not be more alluring or more persuasive. The denial of
the business owner's trespass and privacy claims on grounds that narrowly limit his assertion makes the case that the press should have
some latitude where public interest and public health are threatened
by the activities exposed. Of course, the latitude accorded the press in
the medical lab case involved denying trespass liability on causation
grounds and denying privacy liability on the grounds of the level of
offensiveness of the conduct of the press. Yet, undeniably, the decision
represents an erosion of the Branzburg and Dietemann iron curtain.
In Desnick v. ABC, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that no trespass liability befell reporters who obtained en122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1204.
Id.
See id.
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try to an eye clinic by fraud and who videotaped clinic activities with
hidden cameras. 12 9 In that case, reporters for ABC's Prime Time Live
exposed what they claimed were several examples of the clinic's medical staff recommending cataract surgery to Medicare patients who did
not need it.'30 Desnick Eye Center, the target of the investigation, operated 25 cataract surgery facilities in the Midwest and performed
more than 10,000 cataract operations a year, mostly on senior citizens
whose surgeries were paid by Medicare.' 3 ' The ABC reporters posed as
patients to obtain access and consultations with clinic doctors.' 3 2 After
the report was broadcast, the plaintiff clinic and two of its surgeons
brought trespass, defamation and related actions against ABC.las The
District Court dismissed all claims, and the Court of Appeals affirmed
the dismissal of the trespass and privacy claims, but reversed the dismis34
sal of the defamation claim.'
The reasoning of the Seventh Circuit illuminates the questions
this article probes. Acknowledging that the Desnick Eye Center would
not have permitted the ABC reporters to enter its offices had it known
their true identities, their purpose and their use of hidden cameras,
the court held that in some instances, consent may be effective even if
it is obtained by fraud.' 5 Analogizing that restaurateurs could not
state a claim for invasion of privacy against a restaurant critic who concealed his or her identity when visiting a restaurant to sample its fare
and report on it, and that a shopkeeper could not sue a browser for
trespass who only pretended to have the money to buy some expensive
item that they looked at closely in the store, the court decided that it
would lead to absurdities if consent, even if fraudulently obtained,
13 6
were not given greater legal effect.
The court specifically found that the journalists in the case had
not invaded "any of the specific interests that the tort of trespass seeks
to protect"' 3 7 in that ABC's conduct did not interfere with the eye
center's ownership or possession of their property. The facts supporting such a determination included that the business premises and of129.

Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1353.

130.

See id. at 1348.

131.
132.

Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1348.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See id. at 1347.
Id. at 1351.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1352.
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fices entered by the journalists were open to any patient or prospective
patient; the surgeons who were videotaped with the hidden cameras
were engaged in medical communications with the testers themselves
rather than private communication with others; there was no disruption of the activities of the clinics; there was no invasion of any person's private space; no violation of the doctor-patient privilege
occurred; and since the journalists were recording their own conversations with the physicians "[t]here was no eavesdropping on a private
138
conversation."
Of particular significance to the court was the journalists' purpose
in fraudulently obtaining entry and secretly videotaping what they
saw. 139 Obviously, that purpose was to obtain evidence of Medicare
abuse to document any potential threat to the health of patients, and
to expose the practice of recommending unnecessary surgeries. 140 To
the court, such purposes paralleled those of housing discrimination
testers-citizens who pose as prospective home buyers or renters in
order to obtain evidence of housing discrimination-who are not subjected to liability for trespass even though they obtain entry onto premises fraudulently. 14 ' The court saw no difference between housing
discrimination testers and the ABC reporters who fraudulently obtained entry into the Desnick Eye Centers to gather evidence of
42
wrongdoing.1
Desnick is a compelling case and its reasoning is potent in support
of this article's proposal for recognition of a public interest privilege to
trespass and invade privacy when the purpose served by it is exposing
unlawfulness or wrongdoing or threats to the public interest that
would otherwise go unknown and unreported.
The Michigan Court of Appeals followed the reasoning of the
Desnick court in a 2000 opinion affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of a Detroit television station.14 3 In American Transmission, Inc. v. Channel 7 of Detroit, the plaintiff transmission repair shop
sued a local broadcast station for trespass after one of the station's investigative reporters misrepresented her identity and purpose to gain
138.
Id. at 1353.
139.
See id. at 1351.
140.
See id. at 1353.
141.
See id.
142.
See id.
143.
See Am. Transmission, Inc. v. Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc., 609 N.W.2d 607
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
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access to the plaintiffs premises. 144 The reporter later, based on what
she saw in the plaintiffs shop, went on the air with a report claiming
that the plaintiff attempted to deceive a potential customer into paying
for unnecessary transmission repairs. 14 5 The owners of the shop sued
46
for trespass and defamation.
The essence of the plaintiff's trespass claim was that the reporter's
entry onto the premises was unauthorized because she had misrepresented her identity and purpose for being there.' 4 7 Specifically adopt-

ing the Desnick holding, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that
the trial judge had properly granted summary judgment against the
plaintiff on the trespass claim.' 48 The court concluded that, although
the reporter had misrepresented her identity, the consent to her entry
given by the owners of the transmission shop was still valid "because
she did not invade any of the specific interests relating to the peacea49
ble possession of land that the tort of trespass seeks to protect."
The court found persuasive the facts that the reporter entered
only those areas of the shop that were otherwise open to the public;
that she videotaped one of the plaintiffs employees while he was discussing transmission repair services with her rather than any other
third party; that she did not invade anyone's private space on the commercial premises; that she did not disrupt the plaintiffs business; and
that her videotaping did not disclose any private facts about anyone's
life.15 0

In the view of the Michigan court, those facts brought this case
within the analytical ambit of Desnick and precluded the imposition of
liability for trespass on the part of the television station and its
reporter.'
As some courts find the Branzburgyoke increasingly burdensome
in application to today's newsgathering that serves the public interest,
others do not. Now, the same facts, the same intrusive means used,
and the same purposes served, have led courts to different results in
different states. To the working press today, 95 years after the publication of Sinclair's book, it's a jumble in the jungle.
144.

Id. at 610.
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150.
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BOLD NEW APPROACH IN NEWS TORTS CASES IS NEEDED AND
WOULD EMINENTLY SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST

The different results obtained from state to state and from case to
case in newsgathering tort cases, as already demonstrated here, cry out
for a reformulation of the analysis courts typically employ in deciding
these cases. The reason decisions in this area are all over the board
and the reason courts have, in most of them, imposed tort liability on
the press for trespass and invasion of privacy, even when those activities
saved lives and have undeniably been in the public interest, is that the
whole issue is being viewed through the wrong lens.
These cases are analyzed by most courts today in terms of whether
the press is protected by a constitutional privilege to commit torts
while gathering the news. Of course, Branzburg long ago decided that
question and any reliance on its holding seals the liability of ajournalist who has trespassed or invaded another's privacy. It is the wrong
question.
The right question is whether a tort privilege should be recognized which protects such activities. The issue of press liability in these
cases should be analyzed and decided through the lens of tort law
itself.
A.

Privileges to the Intentional Torts

The law of torts recognizes eight major privileges to the commission of intentional torts: consent, self-defense, defense of others, defense of property, recovery of property, necessity, authority of law, and
discipline. It is black letter law that "[o]ne who otherwise would be
liable for a tort is not liable if he acts in pursuance of and within the
limits of a privilege of his own or of a privilege of another that was
15 2
properly delegated to him."
Consent is defined as "willingness in fact for the conduct to occur." 15 3 If a person effectively consents to the conduct of another, he
or she may not recover for harm resulting from that conduct.15 4 To be
privileged, such conduct must be within the scope of the consent and
consistent with the specific purpose of the consent. 155 Consent may
apply as a privilege to any of the intentional torts and most definitely to
152.
153.
154.
155.

TORTS § 890 (1965).
§ 892 (1965).
OF TORTS § 892A (1965).
OF TORTS § 890 cmt. b (1965).
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trespass, 156 which would typically take the form of a landowner allowing someone onto their property.
Tort law also accords various privileges to those acting in defense
of their property, in self-defense, or in defense of others. 157 These privileges are limited to the use of reasonable and proportional force, and
typically allow an actor to commit the torts of battery, assault, or false
imprisonment without liability.' 5 8
An owner of real property or chattel may, in limited circumstances, commit a tort in recovering property after it has been wrongfully taken.' 5 9 This privilege allows an actor to commit the intentional
torts of trespass and battery-but the force used to enter land or to
recover a chattel must be reasonable and not likely or intended to
160
cause serious harn.
A trespasser may also assert the privilege of necessity. If one enters land to avert what he or she reasonably believes to be "an imminent public disaster"' 6 1or enters land under the reasonable belief that
it is necessary in order to prevent harm to his or her possessions, he or
she may not be held liable for trespass.' 62 For this privilege to apply,
the entry onto land or use of force must be reasonable and only as a
course of last resort. 163 This privilege also attaches to recovery or conversion of a chattel. 164
Less common in tort law are the privileges of authority of law and
discipline. One who is acting under the authority of law may not be
liable for the tort of trespass if the trespass is reasonably necessary for
the exercise of the authority that is possessed.' 6 5 The privilege of discipline is available to parents and sometimes educators but is limited to
the use of reasonable force or confinement "necessary for ... proper
166
control, training, or education."
156.
157.

158.

See RESTATEMENT
See RESTATEMENT
See RESTATEMENT
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 (1965).
See id.
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The tort privileges have been recognized and justified for centuries on the basis of the public interests they serve and advance. The
privilege to trespass in order to abate a nuisance, for instance, was recognized as early as 1322.167 Private parties who trespass or even outright destroy the nuisance can abate public nuisances, which threaten
the health, safety, or morals of the public, and their actions are
deemed privileged on the basis of the societal interests served. 168
Indeed, the tort privileges have long been protecting defendant
tortfeasors across the board who have "acted to further an interest of
such societal importance that it is entitled to protection, even at the
expense of damage to the plaintiff."169 And both the tether on their
assertion and the purpose they serve is that "privilege is bounded by
current ideas on what will most effectively promote the general
170
welfare."
To apply the tort privileges based on the public interest and the
protection of public health and safety to the torts of trespass and invasion of privacy in newsgathering cases is no stretch. The interests
served (protection of the public health and safety, advancing the public interest) are precisely the same, and the means used (trespass, invasion of privacy) are the very same torts. It is absolutely illogical to deny
their application to news tort cases.
Beyond logic, experience and law dictate the same conclusion.
B.

The Privilege to Trespass Recognized in Tort Law

In most states, a privilege is recognized in limited circumstances
and for specific purposes, which permits unwelcome trespass onto the
private property of others. The privilege is based on the purpose
served by such intrusion-and the purpose which legislatures and
courts find most compelling is that of advancing a legitimate public
interest. It takes the following three basic forms, none of which is of
less public importance than the newsgathering discussed in this article
which saved lives and protected the public health.
167. Y.B. 14 Edw. II 422, pl. 3 (1322).
168.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS §§ 201, cmt.j, 203(2) (1965); State
ex rel. Herman v. Cardon, 344 P.2d 657, 660 (Ariz. 1976); Ajamian v. Township of N.
Bergen, 246 A.2d 521, 527-28 (N.J. Super. 1968).
169.

W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 16, at 109 (5th ed. 1984).

170.
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1. Unannounced, Warrantless Government Inspections of
Commercial Premises
Federal, state and local government inspectors enjoy the privilege
to make warrantless inspections of private commercial property over
the objections of property owners if the public interest demands it.
Businesses subject to close governmental regulation generally may not
claim trespass if government inspectors without the business' permission enter their premises because they engage in commerce that affects the public health or well being, or pose risks to the general
public.
The U.S. Supreme Court has extensively analyzed the reach of this
privilege. In New York v. Burger,17 1 police officers, pursuant to a state
statute that authorized warrantless inspections of automobile junkyards, entered and inspected the junkyard of the respondent Burger.
Their inspection of the premises uncovered several stolen vehicles and
172
parts, and Burger was charged with possession of stolen property.
The respondent then moved in state court to suppress the evidence on
the ground that the inspection of his premises had violated his right to
privacy and contravened the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. 173 The New York Court of Appeals
ruled that the inspection was unconstitutional and it ordered the evi75
dence suppressed. 174 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.'
The Court found that the junkyard business was closely regulated,
that the regulation ofjunkyards served the public interest in preventing automobile theft, and that warrantless inspections of junkyard
premises are necessary to effectuate the close regulation and monitoring of junkyards that the controlling New York statute required to
thwart trafficking in stolen auto parts.176 The Court drew several bright
lines. It held that "[a]n expectation of privacy in commercial premises, however, is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home." 177 "This expectation is particularly
attenuated in commercial property employed in 'closely regulated' in171.

New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 693 (1987).

172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 695.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 697-98.
Id. at 718.
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dustries." 178 The Court has emphasized that no reasonable expectation
of privacy exists if a business engages in an industry with a history of
pervasive government monitoring and regulation. 179 Supreme Court

precedent is abundant.
Warrantless, uninvited and unwelcome entries onto and inspections of the premises of specific businesses and industries categorized
as closely regulated do not violate the privacy, property rights or
Fourth Amendment rights of the owners of such premises. 180 Termed
the "Colonnade-Biswell doctrine"'181 by the Supreme Court, this principle was carved in Colonnade v. United States182 and United States v. Biswell1 83 and was applied against owners of a mine who resisted federal
184
entry and inspection of their premises in Donovan v. Dewey.
In Donovan, the Court addressed three questions. It found that
the statute pursuant to which the federal inspectors were acting, the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, specifically permitted the
inspection of surface mines at least twice every year; 18 5 it found that
mining was an industry that since the 1800's had been closely and
heavily regulated by the government as an industry that poses particular danger to the health and well being of workers and others; 18 6 and
that the federal government's interest in improving health and safety
conditions in the nation's mines justified the need for warrantless inspections in order to enforce the government's mine safety standards
187
and expose health and safety dangers existing in operating mines.
The significance of the Burger decision, punctuating the Colonnade-Biswell doctrine, is that it articulates a test for determining the
reasonableness of a warrantless inspection of a pervasively regulated

178.

Id.

179. See id.
180. See id. at 699-700.
181. Id. at 701.
182. Colonnade Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (holding that a warrantless search of a catering business pursuant to a federal statute authorizing the inspecdon of liquor dealers was invalid because the statute did not authorize entry without a
warrant).
183. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (holding that a warrantless inspection of a pawn shop which was federally licensed to sell weapons pursuant to the
Gun Control Act of 1968 was valid because the business was pervasively regulated by the
government and licensed by it).
184. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
185. Id. at 596.
186. Id. at 603.
187. Id. at 604.
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business, which puts a fine point on the doctrine. The point is that not
every inspection of a closely regulated business is permissible absent a
warrant or consent. Only reasonable warrantless inspections are constitutionally permissible and there are three criteria that must be met
by the governmental body making such an inspection. 188 There must
be a "substantial government interest that informs the regulatory
scheme pursuant to which the inspection is being made," 189 like the
government interest in improving safety conditions in the nation's
mines in Donovan; "the warrantless inspections must be 'necessary to
further [the] regulatory scheme" 190 as the Court in Donovan found
unannounced inspections of mines necessary to catch safety violations;
and that the inspection program authorized in the statute provide "'a
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant,"'"91 in statutory language that unambiguously alerts operators of certain businesses that
their commercial premises can be inspected and searched, and in
which the scope of such a statutorily authorized search is defined in
92
terms of time, place and extent.'
The Court then wasted little time in determining that all three
criteria had been easily met by the facts of the case in thatjunkyards
are closely regulated businesses, 193 that warrantless inspections are
necessary to detect trafficking in stolen vehicles and parts,194 and that
the NewYork statute very clearly putjunkyard operators on notice that
regular and unannounced inspections would be made and that the
statute specifically addressed the time, place and scope that those inspections could take. 19 5 Satisfied on all points, the Court reversed the
New York Court of Appeals and ordered the evidence obtained in the
96
warrantless inspection admitted.'
Thus, warrantless and unwelcome government inspections of commercial premises, which would otherwise be trespassory and violative
of the Fourth Amendment, are readily sustainable. The key to virtually
every case, in which such inspections are made and challenged, is the
188.

See Burger,482 U.S. at 702.

189.

Id.

190.
191.

Id. (citing Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600).
Id. at 703 (citing Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600).

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See id.
See id, at 703-04.
See id. at 710.
See id. at 711.
Id. at 718.
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public interest that courses through the Colonnade-Biswell doctrine and
the Burger analysis that sharpens it.
2.

Warrantless Entry Onto and Inspection of Specific Closely
Regulated Businesses

Businesses and even entire industries whose products or services
pose a potential threat to the health, safety or well-being of the public
are exactly the businesses closely regulated by the government. Obviously, the purpose of such close regulation is to prevent any harm to
the public resulting from such products or services, and the means
used are warrantless inspections and entries onto private commercial
property over the objections, in many cases, of the owners. However,
the privilege to trespass onto closely regulated commercial premises
when the public interest requires it has been recognized and applied
to a spate of industries whose products or services may potentially endanger the public. The following are specific industries that courts
have found to be well within the reach of the Collonade-Biswell doctrine
subjecting them to warrantless entries and inspections.
(a)

The Food Industry

Chicago advertises itself as "the city of a thousand restaurants." It
has also served up a good deal of case law on point over the years. For
example, in Contrerasv. City of Chicago,when a warrantless inspection of
a Chicago pizza restaurant was conducted despite the owner's objection, the U.S. District Court in 1996 moved quickly through the current analysis when considering whether a governmental inspection of
197
private property is a violation of privacy or property rights.
As a threshold matter, the court concluded that the food industry,
generally, and restaurants, specifically, have long been held to be
closely regulated industries, the warrantless inspection of which required satisfaction of the three-part Burger test.19 As to the first prong
[a substantial government interest informing the regulatory scheme
and inspection], the court found that the city's regulation of the food
industry was undeniably pervasive given the "substantial governmental
interest underlying the City's food and sanitation regulations." 199 That
patrons could die or sustain serious illnesses as a result of a number of
197.
198.
199.

Contreras v. City of Chicago, 920 F. Supp. 1370 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
Id. at 1389.
Id. at 1389.
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health risks associated with the preparation of food was obvious, and,
even the restaurant owner did not dispute the pervasiveness of the
city's regulatory presence in "enforcing health and sanitation requirements in restaurants." 20 0 From such pervasive regulation of the restaurant business, the Court concluded that this restaurant owner was
certainly "aware that his commercial property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes." 20 ' Of course, it is
precisely that interest of the public in being protected from E-coli bacteria poisoning, salmonella or other health threats that drives this
privilege.
Finding the second prong of the Burger test met in this case [the
warrantless inspection must be necessary to further the regulatory
scheme], the court recognized that "[a] dvance knowledge of an impending health inspection would provide restaurant owners with the
opportunity to take temporary remedial measures designed to mask or
conceal violations (for example, vacuuming rodent droppings) that
would surely undermine the purposes of the City's health and sanita20 2
tion ordinances."
As to the third Burger prong [the inspection program must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant], the court's
consideration of the express language of Chicago's health and sanitation ordinances convinced it that they were explicit and put restaurateurs on notice that their property would be subjected to periodic
warrantless inspections. 20 3 In sum, being satisfied that the ColonnadeBiswell doctrine applied and that the Burger test had been met by the
city, the court rejected the restaurant owner's challenge to the inspec20 4
tion and entered judgment in favor of the city of Chicago.
Eighty-eight years before Contreras, the U.S. Supreme Court similarly decided another challenge to action by Chicago health inspectors
who seized food from a cold storage plant and closed the plant down.
In North American Cold Storage Company v. City of Chicago,20 5 plant owners challenged the seizure by city inspectors of forty-seven barrels of
poultry that the city feared had become putrid and unsafe for human
consumption. The case turned principally on the city's swift closure of
200.

Id.

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. (citing Lesser v. Espy, 34 F.3d 1301, 1306 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Id. at 1390.
Id.
See id. at 1392.
N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
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the cold storage plant until the plant relinquished the unwholesome
poultry.20 6 The owners of the plant complained that the city could not
take such action depriving them of their property without a prior hearing. 20 7 But with emphatic words about the public interest, the Supreme Court affirmed the city's imperatives:
The right to so seize is based upon the right and duty of
the state to protect and guard, as far as possible, the lives
and health of its inhabitants, and that it is proper to provide that food which is unfit for human consumption
should be summarily seized and destroyed to prevent the
20 8
danger which would arise from eating it.
The American Broadcasting Company, acting as it did decades
later in trespassing onto the commercial premises of the Food Lion
grocery stores to expose the unsanitary handling of meat and the re20 9
packaging of dated and unwholesome meat for sale to customers,
would argue the same public interestjustified its actions. The inconsistency in judicial resolution of the two cases cries out for the recognition of a tort privilege to trespass where the public interest demands it.
(b)

Hospitals, Nursing Homes and Other Health Care
Facilities

The state of California's privilege to make warrantless inspections
of health care facilities to insure compliance with various regulations
was challenged as violative of the privacy and property rights of those
facilities in People v. Firstenberg.2 10 In that 1979 case, evidence found by
state health and safety inspectors that the skilled nursing facility in
question had commingled the Social Security checks and family monetary gifts of its residents with its own money to meet payroll led to the
conviction of the facility's owner for unlawfully commingling patients'
funds. 211 On appeal, the owner argued that the evidence seized by the
inspectors should have been suppressed because the inspection was
made without a warrant. 2 12 The California Court of Appeal affirmed
206.

Id. at 315-16.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See id.
Id. at 315.
See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
People v. Firstenberg, 155 Cal. Rptr. 80 (Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
See id. at 82.
See id. at 83.
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the conviction and squarely addressed the public interests that justify
21 3
warrantless, unwelcome inspections of health care facilities.
The court first noted that because of the age of most patients in
skilled nursing homes, their inability to take care of their own financial
affairs, and the absence of any family members who are with them in
the nursing home to oversee their physical care or the management of
their money by the nursing home administrators, the state is responsible for the welfare of those patients "through the medium of licensing
and inspection [since] there is no one else that can or will."214 The
court emphasized that it was "obvious that such inspections are crucial
to the effective oversight of the physical well being of patients, to assure that they are not neglected or even abused." 2 15 And, because of it,
"[t]he necessity for unannounced warrantless inspections in the longterm health care industry is just as great as in the firearms industry and
such inspections are, therefore, reasonable within the meaning of the
216
Fourth Amendment."
In a similar case, acting on a complaint by a patient that an Illinois
surgical facility was filthy and unclean, state health inspectors sought
entry onto the premises of a facility but were denied access by its
owner, a physician, who claimed the inspections were an unreasonable
invasion of his privacy. In Marcowitz v. Dep't of PublicHealth,2 17 the Appellate Court of Illinois in 1982 found that hospitals and health care
facilities were paradigm closely regulated businesses and "that such
regulation is a necessary and proper function of the State's police
power to protect the welfare of its citizens, is so obvious as not to need
21 8
citation of authority."
Inspections of premises of that kind which provide a service that
can potentially endanger the lives of the public, rightly elevate the
health and safety interests of the public above the private property and
privacy rights of the businesses that pose a threat to the public. As
such, as the court found in this case, inspections of hospitals, nursing
homes, and surgical centers are not at all unreasonable or in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. They are in fact necessary to protect life.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See id. at 89.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 86.
Id.

217.

Marcowitz v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 435 N.E.2d 1291 (1ll. App. Ct. 1982).

218.

Id. at 1295.
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Meat and Poultry Processing Plants

In response to the public outrage and the fears fanned across the
nation by Upton Sinclair's account of unsanitary Chicago meat packing plants in THE JUNGLE, President Theodore Roosevelt ordered an
investigation which led to the enactment by Congress of the Meat Inspection Act of 1906.219 Still the law today, that statute requires that
cattle and hogs sold in interstate commerce be federally inspected for
disease at the time of slaughter and for wholesomeness when they are
processed. Typically, both slaughtering and processing are performed
at the same plant, and the Act imposes strict sanitation standards for
those plants. Importantly, the statute also requires that plant owners
allow federal inspectors not only complete and virtually unlimited access to their plants, but also requires that federal inspectors be permitted to remain at a plant permanently-all day, every day, 365 days a
2 20
year if the federal inspectors determine it to be necessary.
Congress imposed similar federal inspection and sanitation requirements on poultry slaughter and processing with the passage of
the Poultry Products Inspection Act of 1957.221
The threat to the public health posed by consumption of unwholesome meat or poultry could not be more serious since e-coli bacteria and salmonella contaminating meat and poultry can cause death.
No room was left in the Congressional scheme imposing federal inspection of these plants for plant owners to claim that their privacy or
private property rights insulated them from that kind of pervasive onsite federal presence. The public interest simply would never permit it.
Yet, even around-the-clock inspection of plants by white-coated
federal health inspectors has not been sufficient to prevent egregious
and horrifying practices in some plants in the country. Hundreds of
deaths have been caused in the United States by salmonella, a bacteria
residing in chicken feces. 2 22 At the time 60 Minutes started investigating it in the 1980s, four million Americans each year were contracting
219. See Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906, ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1260 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1999)); UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Penguin
Books 1985) (1906).
220. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 603(a), 604-06, 608 (1999).
221.
See Poultry Products Inspection Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441
(codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-470 (1988)).
222. Janet Key, Chicken Consumption Up, But So is Salmonella; So Where is the Health
Gain?, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 4, 1990, § 7, at 1, col. 1.
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salmonella and had become ill from it. 223 And it was the media-not

government inspectors-that uncovered the filthy plant conditions
causing the salmonella, exposed it, and alerted millions of citizens to
its threat.
In a sensational 1987 episode, 60 Minutes broadcast hidden camera video from inside a Missouri poultry processing plant where
chicken carcasses were actually bathed in tanks of chlorinated water
brimming with feces. 60 Minutes showed the nation something that
the on-site federal inspectors at that particular processing plant
missed. And that was workers picking up off the filthy plant floor the
carcasses of chickens that were slathered in feces and throwing them
into huge vats with dozens of other carcasses (a brew that 60 Minutes
called "fecal soup") 224 where all the carcasses bobbed in the contaminated water for their final washing before being sent on their way to
22 5
grocery store freezer cases.
60 Minutes could never have exposed on television those sickening
poultry plant practices but for the trespassory and invasive techniques
its reporters employed. If the poultry plant had sued CBS, CBS surely
would have argued that the threat of death and serious illness the
plant posed justified the tortious actions. It is a compelling example of
the need for a tort privilege to shield future investigative reporters all
over the country, from small town to large city, who may be unwilling
to risk exposure to civil suit, perhaps because they would not have the
resources of the CBS television network behind them to fight it.
It is also a powerful example of the effectiveness and persuasiveness of the use of hidden camera video in proving and exposing serious wrongdoing which threatens the public but which is also being
concealed and denied by the business perpetrating it.
3. Trespasses Onto or Destruction of Private Property by
Private and Governmental Actors Claiming Their
Actions Are Justified
Also well recognized in the law is the privilege to trespass onto or
even to destroy the private property of another if reasonably necessary
223. Id.
224. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 6, 1987) (transcript, vol. XIX, No.
51,13 published by journal Graphics, Inc., New York, NY).
225. See id.; See also,James A. Albert, A History of Attempts by the Department ofAgriculture to Reduce FederalInspectionof PoultryProcessingPlants-AReturn to theJungle,51 LA. L.
REv. 1183, 1185-87 (1991).
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to save the life of the trespasser, to prevent personal injury to that person, to prevent the destruction of that person's property, or to avoid
public disaster. As recognized by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit as early as 1906, "the exclusive control of private property is subordinate to the exigencies of public safety and private necessity, and legal sanction is given in such a case to the requirements of
22 6
morality and social duty."
(a)

Justifiable Trespass

The extent to which the public interest predominates over the private property rights of owners of chattels or land has been analyzed in
depth in two Pennsylvania appellate decisions.
In Commonwealth v. Capitolo,227 five defendants trespassed onto the
private property of a utility company, which operated a nuclear power
plant, by burrowing under a fence enclosing the property. 228 Once inside, they sat down ten feet inside the fence and were arrested for refusing to leave. 229 They argued that their entry onto the utility's land
was justified by the public interest served in focusing the public's attention on the safety risks of nuclear power. 23 0 They were convicted of
trespass. 23 ' On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
privilege or defense of justification applies only when the trespasser
establishes four elements:
(1) that the actor was faced with a clear and imminent
harm... ;
(2) that the actor could reasonably expect that the actor's
actions would be effective in avoiding this greater harm;
(3) that there is no legal alternative which will be effective
in abating the harm; and
(4) that the Legislature has not acted to preclude the defense .... 232
The court concluded that the danger posed by the operation of
the nuclear power plant was not imminent and that the defendant tres226.
1906).
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Am. Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co., 143 F. 789, 793 (3d Cir.
Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 498 A.2d 806 (Pa. 1985).
Id. at 807.
Id.
Id. at 807-08.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 809.
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passers "could not establish that their criminal conduct was necessary
to avoid harm
or evil to themselves or others." 233 It upheld the
23 4
convictions.
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Markum, 23 5 several anti-abortion
demonstrators in Pennsylvania attempted to avail themselves of the
public interest privilege to trespass when faced with charges stemming
from a violent demonstration at an abortion clinic. In that case, the
demonstrators pushed their way into the clinic, destroyed medical instruments, and had to be forcibly removed from the property. 236 Their
effort to assert privilege and justification as a defense was overruled by
23 8
the trial judge.2 37 The jury convicted them.
On appeal, the question was whether the trial judge had correctly
precluded the defense. 23 9 The appellate court upheld the trial judge's
ruling on the grounds that the defendants had failed to satisfy the first
element of the four part Capitola test in that it could not reasonably be
argued that a lawful activity such as the operation of an abortion clinic
could be a public disaster or could threaten imminent harm to the
public. 240 In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that both Pennsylvania law and the federal Constitution made pre-viability abortion
lawful in the state, and that the enactment of the state's own statute by
the legislature which permitted abortion certainly reflected a public
policy determination that abortion is in the public interest and poses
24
no harm to the public. '
In Pennsylvania, as in other states, the defense of justification is
statutory. 242 In Pennsylvania particularly, it is limited to situations in
which the actor believes that the trespassoy conduct is necessary "to
avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another,"243 a high standard
which imposes a substantial burden of proof on trespassers claiming
this privilege.
Analytically, this provision is comparable to the privilege of selfdefense or defense of others in that it can only be asserted in situations
where one reasonably believes the action is absolutely necessary to
avoid harm or evil. Investigative reporters could argue in cases like
233.
234.

Id.
Id. at 810.

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Commonwealth v. Markum, 541 A.2d 347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
Id. at 348.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 352.
See id. at 350.

242.

See 18

243.

Markum, 541 A.2d at 348 (citing 18

PA. CoNs. STAT.

§ 5032

(2000).
PA. CoNs. STAT.

§ 5032 (2000)).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

Food Lion or the 60 Minutes poultry plant expos6, that the press trespassed because other means of unearthing the facts had failed and it
was necessary to avoid harm to the public. The parallel is strong.
(b)

The Ultimate Trespass-Destruction of Private
Property

Nothing screams conversion of another's property or trespass to
chattels like the outright destruction of them, and an intriguing 1992
New York State decision explored the applicability of the public interest privilege in these most extreme instances of its assertion. In BartonBarnes, Inc. v. State,244 New York attempted to avoid liability for conversion of a leasing company's vehicle arising out of the outright destruction of the car by the state. The car had been parked on a state office
building ramp and had become covered with toxic chemicals released
during a fire in the building.2 4 5 Concerned that the car was irretrievably contaminated with those toxins, which were lethal to humans, the
state first seized the car, conducted extensive tests on it, and then de24 6
termined that the only way to protect the public was to destroy it.
2 47
They cited the public interest and necessity privilege to do so.
The leasing company, with one less car in its inventory, sued for
conversion and argued that the public interest did not require the destruction of their vehicle since the only less extreme measure attempted by the state to remove the dangerous toxins was to use a
common household cleaner when the car was in the state impound
248
garage.
The court agreed with the leasing company and refused the state's
attempt to assert the privilege in the case. The court reasoned that
"[o]rdinarily, invocation of the doctrine requires only a showing that
the chattel itself has become dangerous and that intervention is necessary .... -1249 The burden of proof on those invoking the privilege of
public necessity, which undeniably operates to avoid liability for what
would otherwise constitute an actionable conversion or trespass, is that
"the act is or is reasonably believed to be necessary for the purpose of
avoiding a public disaster."250 The court concluded that the state's evi244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Barton-Barnes, Inc. v. State, 583 N.Y.S.2d 547 (App. Div. 1992).
Id. at 547.
See id.
See id. at 54748.
See id. at 548.
Id.
Id.

2001-2002]

THE LIABIL1TY OF THE PRF'S

dence fell "woefully short of establishing that reasonable efforts [short
of destroying the car] were made to eradicate the toxic contamination
2 51
of this car."
As with most privileges, the limitations the law imposes on the exercise of the public interest privilege to trespass or convert is one of
reasonableness, both in terms of the requirement that the actor reasonably believes that it is necessary to take the action complained of
and that the action taken itself be reasonable. Those limitations have
certainly been met in the past. The public interest/public necessity
privilege to trespass and even to destroy private property of another
has long been recognized particularly in cases involving both public
safety and necessity. The rationale is that threats to the public safety
justify trespass or conversion in response to those threats. Reflected in
the Restatement, and cast as a "privilege created by public necessity," 252 the cases are vivid.
In S.D. Dep't of Health v. Heim, 253 the South Dakota Supreme Court
found that state health authorities were privileged to destroy the claimant's elk herd because the entire herd was infected with bovine tuberculosis. Upheld was the trial court's finding that, "[t]he hazard to
human health, welfare and safety created by the ... elk herd was of
sufficient gravity to require its abatement for the protection of the general public... "254 Citing precedent which it found controlling, the
Court reiterated that "[t]he public necessity privilege is an extension
of every individual's privilege to take whatever steps appear reasonable
to prevent an imminent public disaster."2 55 It concluded a herd of elk
with a contagious disease that could threaten human life undeniably
posed a threat of public disaster, which justified and privileged the ani2 56
mals' destruction by the state.
As far back as 1851, in considering the liability of the mayor of
New York for trespass as a result of his order to "blow up" and immediately demolish the plaintiff's building, the NewJersey Court of Appeals
recognized the privilege of public necessity. 25 7 And, they applied it to
shield the mayor from liability. 258 Finding that a raging fire at risk of
251.
252.
253.

Id.
OF TORTS § 262 (1965).
S.D. Dep't of Health v. Heim, 357 N.W.2d 522 (S.D. 1984).
RESrATEMENT (SECOND)

254. Id. at 524.
255.

Id. (quoting City of Rapid City v. Boland, 271 N.W.2d 60, 65 (S.D. 1978)).

256.

Id.

257.

See Am. Print Works v. Lawrence,23 N.J.L. 590 (Ct. App. 1851).

258.

See id. at 595.
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spreading to other buildings created a public necessity that privileged
commission of the tort, the court analyzed the privilege and its applicadon to the case. 259 "The necessity must be immediate, imperative, and
in some cases extreme and overwhelming." 260 The court emphasized
that "mere expediency or utility will not suffice," 26 1 but that, "[t]he
conservation of life is one of the occasions which will call it into exercise," 26 2 and that was precisely the purpose of the trespass challenged
in the case.
The destruction of the plaintiff's house by the alcalde of San Francisco in 1849 during a fire was challenged in Surocco v. Geary,2 63 a trespass suit brought by the landowner.
The alcalde asserted a privilege to have trespassed and destroyed
the property based on public necessity. 2 64 The California Supreme
Court agreed, acknowledging that "[t]he right to destroy property, to
prevent the spread of a conflagration, has been traced to the highest
law of necessity. '265 Confirming that necessity outweighs private rights,
the court held that "private rights of the individual yield to the considerations of general convenience, and the interests of society." 266 The
court found the public interest in preventing a fire from spreading,
given the risk of loss of life and property, clearly necessitated the trespass and destruction of property in that case, and denied the land267
owner any recovery.
With particularly relevant application to newsgatherers is the comment in the Restatement that such a privilege "is not confined to an
official representative of the public . . . [but] is equally applicable to
afford immunity to a private citizen, so long as he acts for the purpose
268
of the protection of the public against the impending disaster."
One resisting the extension of this privilege to newsgatherers trespassing onto commercial premises to serve a public interest will find it difficult to deny this logic: if the public safety and necessity can justify the
complete destruction of one's premises by a private party, it can cer259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

See id. at 601-02.
Id. at 604.
Id.
Id.
Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853).
Id. at 70.
Id. at 73.
Id.
Id. at 74.
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tainlyjustify a trespass of those same premises with a hidden camera to
expose a dire threat to the public.
The Surrocco court also addressed the concerns of those opposed
to a tort privilege for news gatherers because it would enable the press
to unreasonably and unjustifiably claim the privilege in minor and frivolous cases where the public interest is not seriously threatened. 269 In
that case, the question was whether the alcalde of San Francisco was
justified on the basis of public necessity to trespass onto property and
destroy it.27 0 In terms of the privilege of necessity and of the privilege
to act in the public interest on the basis of an overarching public need,
the court framed the question in these terms: "[W]ho is to judge of
27 1
the necessity of the destruction of property?"
The court answered the question by acknowledging that in some
instances it may well be difficult to determine whether the public interest served outweighs the private property rights affected. 272 The solution that the California Supreme Court embraced in those cases in
which the private property owner disputed the existence of a public
interest or necessity thatjustified trespass or destruction of that private
property, was to subject to liability for damages anyone who asserted
such a privilege and did so "without apparent or actual necessity" that
273
would be "clearly shown" in every case.

The advantage to such a solution is that the interests of the public
are protected since trespass would be privileged, which could save lives
or otherwise protect the public interest or public health and safety at
the same time, the interests of the private property owner are protected because they have recourse if the one asserting the privilege in
fact does so frivolously and without grounds or cause and without clear
proof of reasonably apparent or actual necessity.
A tort privilege to gather news of serious public interest would
work. Moreover, it is illogical to deny a tort privilege protection to
reporters exposing salmonella tainted chicken and barbecue flavored
rancid meat while allowing health inspectors investigating bovine tuberculosis this protection.
Turning to a different analysis of tort privileges which also supports their extension to newsgathering, it should be remembered that
269.

See Surocco, 3 Cal. 69.
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271.
272.
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trespass and invasion of privacy are not the only torts that are privileged if committed by some actors advancing the public interest. Defamation and interference with contractual relations are also privileged
if committed for that purpose.
C.
1.

The Privilege to Defame

Child Abuse Reporting

In all states, the public interest in protecting the well being of
children is so compelling that mandatory child abuse reportersteachers, health care professionals, school counselors-have been
granted qualified immunity from defamation actions arising out of
good faith reports. 2 74 California goes even further and has conferred
absolute immunity on mandatory reporters even if their reports are
made negligently or are knowingly false. 2 75 As well, most states recognize a qualified immunity for voluntary reporters of child abuse if the
276
reports are made in good faith.
The competing interests framed in these cases are readily analyzed. On the one hand is the reputational interest of a parent, typically, or other person named in a child abuse report. On the other
hand is the public interest in protecting children from injury or death
at the hands of an abuser. Legislatures and courts have not had difficulty striking the balance, and out of it has emerged a public interest
privilege to defame when mistakenly reporting suspected child abuse.
The analysis generally followed by the courts when parents or
others claim to have been wrongly accused of child abuse and defamed
by it is to examine in summary judgment proceedings whether there is
evidence of bad faith on the part of the reporter to overcome the presumption, often statutory, that the report was filed in good faith by one
having reason to believe that the child was being abused.
Illustrative of that line of cases is Heinrich v. Conemaugh Valley Memorial Hospital,277 a 1994 Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in
which a child's relatives sued a hospital for reporting suspected child
abuse after their child was treated for head injuries. The suit was dis274. See, e.g., TEX. CODE. ANN. § 261.101 (Vernon 2000); ARmZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3620
(2000); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 419 (Consol. 1997).
275.

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172 (West 2000).

276. See, e.g., Wx'o. STAT. ANN. § § 14-3-201-15 (Michie 1986); IDAHO CODE §161620 (Michie 2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(2) (West 2000).
277. Heinrich v. Conemaugh Valley Mem. Hosp., 648 A.2d 53 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1994).
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missed because of the failure of the relatives to offer any evidence at all
to overcome the statutory presumption of good faith shielding the reporter. 278 The most noteworthy aspect of the decision was the court's
determination that the public interest in these cases is so great that the
law does not require an investigation or verification on the part of the
reporter before the potentially defamatory and allegedly false report is
filed.2 79 Rather, given the urgency of saving the lives of children being
abused, prompt reporting justifies omitting time-consuming investigations on the part of reporters to verify the observations upon which
280
they rely.
Voluntary reporters, such as neighbors, enjoy a similar privilege to
defame within coterminous bounds. In a 1995 New Jersey Appellate
Division decision, 2 81 summary judgment was ordered in favor of neighbors who reported suspected child abuse on the part of the parents of
three children who lived near them. In that defamation action, the
plaintiff parents claimed that their good names had been destroyed
and that, in truth, when authorities investigated, no child abuse was
found.28 2 Rather, the injuries sustained by the children were caused by
falls and other mishaps while playing.28 3 The defendant neighbors testified in their depositions that they had reasonable grounds for believing that one of the children's legs was broken as a result of abuse and
that they had seen one of the plaintiffs screaming and yelling hysterically at the children.28 4 The court was satisfied that the state's statutory
immunity for good faith reporting attached, and ordered summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. 285 Significantly, the court acknowledged that some unfounded child abuse reports are inevitable,
but that it is in the public interest to risk harm to the reputations of
those wrongly accused of child abuse for the greater good of preventing injury and death to children in those instances where the abuse is
28 6
founded.
278.
279.
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Communication in the Public Interest

A qualified or conditional privilege that shields speakers and publishers who defame others while advancing the public interest or public welfare is also well worn law. The Restatement denominates it a
"conditional privilege arising from occasion" 287 which shields the
speaker or publisher from liability if the statement is made "upon an
occasion that makes it conditionally privileged and.., the privilege is
28 8
not abused."
Public policy demands that such speech enjoy immunity from liability absent malice because the public interest served by the publication, even if erroneous and defamatory, outweighs the reputational
interests of the plaintiff. Cases in which courts across the country have
elevated the interests of public welfare to those of private reputation
are legion, and among the most compelling are those in which commercial establishments have sued for defamation and the alleged
tortfeasors have claimed a public interest to have committed the tort.
In Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinal Pub. Co., 28 9 a newspaper and laboratory were sued for defamation by the seller of bottled "spring water"
over a published article that questioned whether the water being sold
in the grocery stores of the plaintiff really came from springs. The
plaintiff grocery chain alleged that its corporate reputation had been
defamed and that its product had been disparaged by the newspaper
article which reported that an independent laboratory's analysis of the
2 90
chain's "spring water" did not confirm that it was pure spring water.
Summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants upon the
court's determination that the statements were qualifiedly privileged. 291 The Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the grant of summary judgment.292 The court determined that " [s] tatements .... made
...
for the public welfare, enjoy a qualified privilege. 293 The court
recognized the privilege as a means to "balance the interests in reputa2 94
tion with the publication of information in the public interest,"
which would certainly "include such essentials of life as food and
287.
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289.
290.
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293.
294.
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water."2 95 "As an essential of human life, drinking water is a paradigm
of legitimate public concern," 29 6 the court concluded.
The newspaper article, which drew the grocery chain's ire, reported that the bottled "spring water" being sold by the chain could
not possibly be pure spring water because samples tested at the newspaper's direction were contaminated with chlorine. 297 Alerting the
public to the potential consumption of unhealthy drinking water
brought the statements well within the qualified public interest privilege to shield the publishers from defamation liability regardless of the
2 98
truth of the report.
Another significance of this case is that it extends the qualified
public interest privilege to defame beyond traditional personal defamation to product disparagement. 299 That, of course, makes even
more on point the analyses and principles of this tort privilege to the
comparable one which this article advocates forjournalists committing
the torts of trespass or invasion of privacy on commercial premises.
The public interest privilege shielded a television station from defamation liability in Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co.,300 decided in 1988
by the California Court of Appeal. The plaintiff was a building contractor who did work on Sacramento homes with home improvement
loans financed by HUD.301 The defendant television station broadcast
a consumer report critical of the plaintiff's work, specifically "warped
doors, peeling paint, cracking plaster, shoddy work inside and
out... .,3o2 The plaintiff contractor sued for defamation, and the court
entered summary judgment in favor of the broadcasting company,
which in its view enjoyed a qualified public interest privilege to
3 03
defame.
On appeal, the entry of summary judgment was reversed and a
remand was ordered for the determination as to whether the television
station and its reporter acted absent implied malice given the fact that
the record generated a fact question as to whether the reporter reason295.

Id. at 230.
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ably believed the truthfulness of the criticisms that aired.3 0 4 However,
the decision was resounding in terms of the qualified public interest
privilege, which is statutory in California. As the court viewed it,
a publication is of public interest if its appeal is not
merely as a matter of gossip or idle curiosity (citations
omitted), but deals with substantial matters affecting the
general public such as the prevention of crime and apprehension of criminals, the honest discharge of duties by
public officials, the obtaining of relief from socially recognized evils (citations omitted), or the criticism of work
performed by contractors paid from public funds (cita3
tions omitted). 05
Obviously, that covers a lot of ground.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Ohio applied the public interest
privilege in upholding the trial court's entry of directed verdict in A &
B-Abell Elevator v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg.3 0 6 In that 1995 case, unions
and union members allegedly defamed an elevator contractor in statements to city employees who were responsible for screening public
works contract bidders. 30 7 The union was critical of the contractor's
work on other building projects.3 0 8 The plaintiff contractor sued for
defamation, interference with contractual relations, interference with
prospective business relations, and disparagement. 30 9
Reasoning that the same public policy that conferred a qualified
privilege to defame on patients who make defamatory statements to
medical licensing boards, viz. that the "public has an interest in ensuring that only qualified persons are licensed to practice," 3 10 the court
found that the public interest in the fitness of contractors was no less
significant or less deserving of legal protection. 3 11 "The public has an
interest in ensuring that only competent... contractors receive public
work, particularly where the work affects the public safety,"3 1 2 it held.
304.
305.
306.
Council,
307.
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Another Ohio Supreme Court decision turned on what the court
considered the defendant's "moral obligation to speak."3 13 In Hahn v.
Kotten,3 14 the plaintiff, a district manager for the Woodman Insurance
Company, admitted to withholding clients' premiums from the company, keeping those funds in his own personal business account, and
lying to company officials. The plaintiff sued the company's agency
manager, Kotten, for defamation, claiming harm to his reputation
when Kotten and others told the plaintiff's former policy holders, who
telephoned for him after his separation from the company, that the
plaintiff had been terminated for cause which may have included embezzlement, fraud, or violation of insurance regulations.
The court sustained the trial court's grant of the defendants' motion for directed verdict, finding that the defendants had "a legal and
moral obligation to speak." 315 The court held that because the plaintiff
admitted to withholding clients' premiums from the company, the
company "had the legal316and moral obligation to communicate as they
did with the insureds."
The court laced its decision with alluring analyses. Allegedly tortious statements made by people motivated by duty to make them are
protected by the qualified privilege to defame even though "the duty is
not a legal one, but only a moral or social duty of imperfect obligation,"3 17 the court ruled. And, with poignant application to the press
privilege to commit the torts that this article examines, the court explained the policy predicate for its decision: "[w]here circumstances
exist which cast on [the defendant] the duty of making a communication; or where [he] is so situated that it becomes right in the interests
of society that he should tell third persons certain facts" 318 that defendant will be shielded from liability for good faith, non-malicious communication which is made in the interests of society and the public.
Of course, the situation of the press is as the eyes and ears of the
public, which is nothing less than its constitutional charter, and in it
inheres the obligation and right of the press to report to the public
facts of importance and necessity.
A last well established application of the public interest privilege
to defame involves false accusations of a crime. Communications to
police concerning a crime are qualifiedly privileged. 3 19 And even if
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Hahn v. Kotten, 331 N.E.2d 713, 719 (Ohio 1975).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 719.

318.

Id.

319.

See DAN B. DOBBS, THE

LAW OF TORTS,

§ 414, at 1159 (2d ed. 2000).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

those communications are false and the individual accused is subsequently cleared of wrongdoing and later sues for defamation, absent
malice on the part of the person making the accusation, their report is
privileged and they are shielded from liability.3 20 The rule is unambiguous: "communications by private citizens giving information to
proper authorities for the prevention or detection of crime" 321enjoy
the qualified public interest privilege.
The public interest served, of course, is the prevention or detection of crime which, absent malice on the part of the accuser, is an
interest which the courts have long believed outweighs any individual's
interest in his own reputation. The reasoning is that the harm to one's
reputation - the commission of the tort of defamation against an individual - is a small price to pay for assuring the greater public good
in the fearless reporting by private citizens of information relating to
the prevention or detection of crime.
The public interest privilege to defame could not be more analogous to the newsgathering tort privilege this article proposes, which
would shield reporters who trespass or invade privacy while on commercial premises investigating news in the public interest. If the former makes sense, the latter makes sense. If the former is good public
policy, the latter is good public policy. If the former is recognized as a
legitimate tort privilege because it serves the public interest, the latter
should be because its sole purpose would be to shield investigations
that produce news that serves the public interest.
To deny the latter while honoring the former is a leap of illogic
that produces stark unfairness and injustice. If the public interest privilege to defame protects a published investigative report that concluded that a grocery store chain's bottled spring water was not 100%
pure spring water, shouldn't there be a public interest privilege to trespass or invade privacy to crack a story from inside a poultry plant about
salmonella that kills hundreds and injures millions of people? And, if
there is a public interest privilege to defame in warning the public
about warped doors, peeling paint, and cracking plaster, shouldn't
there be a public interest privilege to trespass or invade privacy to get a
hidden camera inside a grocery store to capture them pouring barbecue sauce on rancid meat to mask the awful odor and threat of death?
To ask these questions, of course, is to answer them. And, the case
for recognition of a newsgathering privilege becomes even stronger
when considering the fact that yet another comparable public interest
320. Id.; See also, 50 AM. JUR. 2D § 277, at 545 (2000).
321.
Dijkstra v. Westerink, 401 A.2d 1118, 1121 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1979)
(citing PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 115 (4th ed. 1971).
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privilege has been applied to two additional torts that can involve financial harm to a business greater than trespass or invasion of privacy.
D. The Privilege to Interfere with ContractualRelations and Prospective
Business Advantage ifthe Purpose is to Protect the Public Interest
Tort law also recognizes a privilege for an actor to commit the
torts of interference with contractual relations or interference with
business expectancies if the actor can establish a proper purpose for
doing so. Some ends definitely do justify the means of a person interfering with another's contractual relations or prospective business ad32 2
vantage and causing them damage.
A formidable wall of case law stretching back to 1906 well illustrates the reach of this public interest privilege. In 1906, an Illinois
appellate court found that a defendant was justified in intentionally
interfering with the contractual relations of a parochial boarding
school because she acted to protect the health and well being of
others.3 23 The plaintiff in that case was the mother of students at the
boarding school who had a contract with the school for room, board
and music instruction for her 13 year-old daughter and two younger
3 25
daughters.3 24 The defendant was the mother of another student.
The defendant heard that the plaintiff's husband had a contagious disease ("the itching disease") that could be transmitted to others at the
3 26
boarding school by using the same towels or utensils.
Concerned, the defendant told the Mother Superior who in turn
prohibited the plaintiffs daughter from attending school until she
could provide a doctor's certification that there was no risk of harm to
other children.3 2 7 Finding that the defendant was privileged to act as
she did, the court focused on her motives. 328 The defendant had a
daughter in the school. And since the plaintiffs daughter might well
be a medium of transmission of her father's infectious disease, "there
was danger that the children might be infected with it and transmit it
to the other scholars."3 2 9 Overturning a jury's verdict in favor of the
322. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1965); see also DOBBS supra note
319, at 67.
323. Legris v. Marcotte, 129 11H.App. 67 (1906).
324. See id. at 68.
325. See id. at 72.
326. See id.
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plaintiff on the tort cause of action, the court held that the defendant
was justified in interfering with the plaintiff's contract because of the
threat to the health of the defendant's child and all other children
33 0
attending the school.
A classic 1924 British Chancery opinion on point is a torts
casebook staple still cited today. Brimelow v. Casson3 31 addressed the
tort liability of several members of a trade union committee who undeniably banded together to interfere with the plaintiffs contractual relations and prospective business advantage.
The plaintiff was the manager of a theater company by the name
of the King Wu Tut Tut Revue that toured England in the early
1920s. 33 2 It was a vaudeville and dance company and the members of
the plaintiff's troop were chorus girls who were paid virtually starvation
wages. 333 The evidence was that the girls were not even paid enough
money for their sustenance, that two or three of them would have to
live together just to pool resources for food and rent, and that the
plaintiff's refusal to pay a living wage drove the girls to "lead a vicious
life."'33 4 One member of the plaintiffs touring troop, an 18-year-old
girl, was being paid so little that she began "living in immorality with
another member of the company, a tiny, deformed creature, a dwarf.
335
He was an abnormal man."
The defendants, including members of the Musicians Union and
National Association of Theatrical Employees, were outraged by the
conditions in which the chorus girls were required to live. They were
concerned for the troop's health and well-being. For the purpose,
then, of forcing the plaintiff to begin paying his dancers minimum
wage, the defendants interfered with existing contracts between theater proprietors and the plaintiff in two different English towns by
speaking with the proprietors and inducing them to break their contracts with the plaintiff.3 3 6 In all, it was a vigorous campaign pursued by
the defendants to not only interfere with existing contractual relations
of the plaintiff, but also to publicize to all theater managers through330.
331.
332.
333.
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out England their desire that no one book the plaintiff's troop until
337
the plaintiff began paying his employees at least the minimum wage.

The Chancery Division found the defendants' interference to be
privileged, that they should not be held liable for what would otherwise be actionable tortious conduct, and that they should not be enjoined from continuing it as long as the justification rema'ined.338

Again, the court as a threshold matter considered the purpose of
the interference in determining whether it was privileged. And the
overwhelming evidence in this case was that the defendants' purpose
was to "take all necessary peaceful steps to terminate the payment of
this insufficient wage."3 39 The Chancery was persuaded that the defendants' interference with the plaintiffs contracts and prospective business relations as the means they considered most effective in insuring
the chorus girls' health and well being arose out of a duty they owed
340
"to their calling and to its members, and... to the public."
In terms of the application of the reasoning in this legendary case
to the same privilege that journalists should enjoy today for committing the torts of trespass or invasion of privacy, the nexus is the motivation and purpose for the tortious conduct. The Brimelow court
acknowledged the purpose which motivated the defendants' interference torts was that it was the "only means open to them of bringing to
an end his [plaintiff s] practice of underpayment."3 41 Actually, of
course, the defendants' tortious conduct was not "the only way" that
they could have pressured the plaintiff to pay at least a minimum wage
to his employees. Publicizing the plaintiffs practices in newspapers
throughout England would have been a means short of inducing theater managers with whom the plaintiff had already contracted to break
those contracts. But, the defendants were obviously convinced that
means short of the tortious action they took would have been unsuccessful in bringing the plaintiffs practices to a halt. With its subsequent reference to the record, evidence of the duty which the
defendants felt to the chorus girls involved, other union members, and
even the public "to take all necessary peaceful steps to terminate the
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payment of this insufficient wage," 3 4 2 the court did not impose any
different course of action on them.
The point could not be more compelling. Smuggling in a hidden
camera to capture and expose the public health threat posed by Food
Lion's unsanitary food handling practices, was not a legal means available to ABC. But in the exercise of its good faith journalistic judgment,
ABC was obviously convinced that all necessary steps had to be taken to
protect the public from the dire health risk, including committing the
torts of trespass and invasion of privacy.
And, there's not a difference in terms of legal analysis between
those newsgathering torts and the two business interference torts that
the union members in Brimelow committed. The practical difference
to plaintiff business owners in these cases, however, is that the interference torts result in far greater damages as each will typically involve a
loss of business, measurable in money damages, while trespass or invasion of privacy are generally more dignitary torts that often do not
cause loss of business. Unless, of course, there is truth to what the
press learns, for instance, that a grocer is selling rancid meat as fresh.
The Supreme Court of California, too, has long recognized a privilege to interfere with contractual relations and induce their breach "to
further certain social interests deemed of sufficient importance to
merit protection from liability."3 43 In Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier,344 the
question was whether sufficient purpose and means were shown tojustify the defendant's interference with the plaintiff's contractual relations. In that case, the plaintiff and defendant were competitors in the
business of selling and distributing ice. The plaintiff established that
the defendant induced another to break his contract with the plaintiff
and that the defendant's motivation for doing so was his own eco3 45
nomic advantage.
In refusing to recognize a privilege to interfere based on such a
purpose, the Supreme Court of California drew a line beyond which
such a privilege would not extend. 3 46 That line separates the public
interest from one's private interest. "Such justification [to interfere
with another's contractual relations without being subject to liability]
exists when a person induces a breach of contract to protect an inter342.
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est that has greater social value than insuring the stability of the contract. [citations omitted] Thus, a person is justified in inducing the
breach of a contract the enforcement of which would be injurious to
health, safety, or good morals. [citations omitted] "3 47
Specifically, the court cited as a paradigm example the interest of
labor unions in improving wages, hours and working conditions as being precisely an interest of social importance sufficient to justify lawful
labor tactics that would otherwise be tortious including interfering
with contractual relations and contracts of employment between employer and employee or even contracts between employer and
3 48
customer.
Illustrative of that principle is McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's
Loc. Union No. 1067,3 49 in which the California Supreme Court held,

"an intentional interference with the advantageous economic relations
of others by the members of labor organizations is not tortious unless
violence is used or the object sought to be accomplished has no reasonable relevance to labor conditions." 35 0 In McKay, the plaintiffs were
employees of an auto dealership who refused to join the union.3 51 The
union set up a picket line to compel members of all unions to refuse to
visit, to do business with, or to deliver goods to the dealership being
targeted.3 52 The obvious purpose of the picketing was to induce or
force others to forego business relations with the dealership and its
sales people.
The court, focusing on both purpose and means, found that the
purpose of the picketing was to advance the welfare of labor generally
and specifically to force nonunion workers to join the union. 353 The
means were determined by the court to have been lawful as it being an
exercise of one's First Amendment rights to peacefully picket and a
right of workers in California to exert economic pressure on employers.3 54 The court considered that evidence sufficient to satisfy both inquiries, and it held that the unions were privileged to interfere with
the contractual and business relations of the auto dealership and its
347.
348.
349.
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salespeople in order to bring pressure to force non-union workers to
join the union.3 5 5 The public interest in strong unions, the organization of non-union businesses by unions, and the purpose served by unions of improving working conditions and the welfare of all labor were
found sufficient to confer this privilege on the union picketers in this
case.

35 6

Particularly noteworthy about these cases is that the unions
granted the privilege to commit what would otherwise be actionable
business torts. They assumed for themselves the responsibility for correcting the labor abuses that motivated them to act. In all of these
cases, not only did other means short of interfering exist for inducing
the results the unions sought, but other entities also could have attempted to achieve the same results. For instance, state or federal
agencies with statutory responsibility to improve wages, hours and
working conditions for labor could produce similar results. Just as governmental entities have responsibilities for insuring the sanitary preparation of food sold in grocery stores around the country. ABC assumed
the responsibility for exposing and correcting the unhealthful food
preparation practices at Food Lion. Similarly, the unions in the California cases assumed responsibility for the correction of practices they
considered to be adverse to the public interest. That an investigative
reporter is not the only one who may be in a position to expose and
correct a threat to the public, or not even in the best position to do it,
would be no disqualifier to the assertion of this privilege, is the teaching of this line of cases.
Assertion of a tort privilege to interfere by the NAACP and its
members in Claiborne County, Mississippi, in boycotting local
merchants' stores and attempting to dissuade other citizens from patronizing those stores was the issue in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Company.357 The purpose and effect of the boycott was to interfere with
the prospective business expectancies of local businesses targeted by
the NAACP and monitored by "store watchers" who were NAACP
members who stood outside the boycotted stores recording the names
of Black citizens who patronized those stores. 358 Other actions were
also taken by the NAACP in an effort to force local businesses to comply with a list of demands for racial equality in the county, including
355.
356.
357.
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mostly nonviolent picketing, speechmaking in which NAACP or-

ganizers encouraged local citizens to boycott the named businesses,
and publishing in a local NAACP leaflet the names of African-American townspeople who continued to shop in the boycotted
3 59
businesses.
In their suit, the local businesses offered evidence that twelve
merchants had suffered loss of earnings during the seven years of the
boycott totaling $944,000.360 The NAACP, while never denying that
the purpose of the boycott was to at least seriously diminish Black patronage of the boycotted businesses, argued that the purpose of the
interference with seventeen merchants was to persuade local business
and civic leaders to end the segregation of public schools and public
facilities in the county, to hire Black police officers, to make public
improvements in Black neighborhoods, to allow Blacks to sit on juries
in the county, to integrate bus stations so that Blacks could use all of
the facilities, and to end the demeaning of African-Americans by local
3 61

white law enforcement officers.
The Chancery Court imposed liability and assessed damages for
loss of business against the NAACP, and the Mississippi Supreme Court
upheld the decision on the basis of interference with business expectancies.3 62 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing that the
NAACP had sought to advance the public interest and insure the civil
rights of all residents of Claiborne County through the lawful exercise
of-their First Amendment free speech rights. 363 As for the purpose of
the lengthy boycott, the court noted that the NAACP "sought to bring
about political, social and economic change. *** [T]o change a social
3 64
order that had consistently treated them as second class citizens."
In terms of the means used, the Court noted that the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and freedom of association guaranteed NAACP members the right to boycott businesses, to band
together to discourage prospective customers from patronizing such
businesses, to demonstrate or picket in front of businesses, and in
those ways to force local businesses to end racial discrimination in the
359.
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All of the means used, the Court found, were constitutionally protected activities of free speech, assembly, association, and petition for which the NAACP could not be held liable even if local
businesses suffered economic damage as a result of the exercise of
366
those constitutional rights.
The public interest privilege to interfere with contractual relations
and prospective business expectancies on which all of the cases dis3 67
cussed above turned has been embraced in the Restatement as well.
In fact, the Restatement enumerates factors to be considered in determining whether interference with a contract or with prospective business relations is proper, including the nature of the actor's conduct,
the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, and the social interests in protecting the action taken as well as the business interests of
the injured party.3 68 In terms of the latter two competing interests, a
comment underscores that "both are to be appraised in the light of the
social interests that would be advanced by their protection." 369 Further, this tenet is advanced:
In some cases the actor may be seeking to promote not
only an interest of his own but a public interest. The actor may believe that certain practices used in another's
business are prejudicial to the public interest, as, for example, his maintenance of a gambling den in the rear
room of his cigar store and in plain site of his patrons, or
his despoiling the environment by polluting a stream or
strip-mining an area without restoring the natural conditions, or his racial or sexual discrimination in his employment policy. *** [W]hether the actor actually believes
that the practices are prejudicial to the public interest,
whether his belief is reasonable, whether he is acting in
good faith for the protection of the public interest, ...
whether the actor employs wrongful means to accomplish
the result [are factors in determining whether the interference is improper] .37
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
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The fit of the Restatement position could not be more perfect on
the thesis of this article. Investigative reporting that serves a legitimate
public interest while violating a business's property or privacy rights
would array the social interests served by the press against the business
interests adversely effected-the same calculation the Restatement
proffers for recognition of a privilege to commit comparable torts.
And with specific applicability to recognition of ajournalists' tort
privilege to trespass and invade privacy, both the exercise by the press
of First Amendment rights in reporting the news and the valid public
and social interests that would be served by it bring such a privilege
well within the reach of these several cases in which a public interest
privilege to commit torts has been affirmed.
In addition to the constitutional protection conferred on such
press activity by the First Amendment, the public policy interest served
by press action that saves lives or otherwise protects the public interest
further justifies extending the same tort public interest privilege recognized in these several cases to the press in trespass and privacy cases.
The same purpose, the same means, and the same public interest
served should result in the same finding that liability to newsgatherers
is privileged under tort law.
V.

CONCLUSION

The extension of the public interest tort privilege to newsgathering cases is about three centuries overdue. During that time the commission of torts was allowed and privileged to protect dwarfs from
being exposed to bad morals, to save adjacent office buildings from
fire damage, and to alert potential home buyers to peeling paint and
cracking plaster. Yet, investigative reporters were held liable for trespass and invasion of privacy in cases like Food Lion where they saved
lives and prevented serious harm to innocent people.
The courts can end the illogic without analytical gymnastics by analyzing newsgathering tort cases through the lens of tort law rather
than constitutional law. The answer has been there from the beginning. The public interest privilege to commit torts, with a pedigree of
centuries confirming its undeniable justification, should be applied in
newsgathering cases on commercial premises for the protection of
these tortfeasors. It was never right to provide the press less protection
in tort cases than other actors were accorded in far less compelling
activities undertaken to advance the public interest.
Apart from most of us chasing the wrong cat in these newsgathering tort cases for so long, the press also needs to adjust its thinking and
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the way it defends these cases. At bottom, the press has defended so
many of these suits on constitutional grounds, asserting a First Amendment privilege to gather the news that just does not exist, rather than
taking a different tact. But the arrogance and sanctimony of many in
the press in brandishing the First Amendment as a talisman for doing
anything-including trespassing and invading privacy-have ill served
their own interests. The press apparently has been quite willing to fall
on its own First Amendment sword in these cases. While thumping
their chests so vehemently about their First Amendment rights, they
have ignored in many cases the efficacy of the public interest privilege
firmly grounded in the law of torts. The press has itself to blame for
years of bad results in news tort cases because of it.
The fairer and more correct analysis of the liability of the press for
newsgathering torts is found in the law of torts.

